When you're thinking over this whole Syrian intervention, it's always helpful to remember your
Clausewitz. Here are a few helpful tidbits that the President should consider if we're going to war with Syria.
In any specific action, in any measure we may undertake, we always
have the choice between the most audacious and the most careful solution.
Some people think that the theory of war always advises the latter. That
assumption is false. If the theory does advise anything, it is the nature
of war to advise the most decisive, that is, the most audacious. Theory
leaves it to the military leader, however, to act according to his own
courage, according to his spirit of enterprise, and his self-confidence.
Make your choice, therefore, according to this inner force; but never
forget that no military leader has ever become great without audacity.
If you're not prepared to go forward boldly, it may be better not to go at all. Half-measures don't win battles. If you know your objective, go forward with confidence. What's our objective, again?
Here's more. Specifically, look at points #5 and #7.
The few principles, therefore, which come up in this connection, and
which depend primarily on the condition of the respective states and armies,
can in their essential parts be very briefly summarized:
I. Warfare has three main objects:
(a) To conquer and destroy the armed power of the enemy;
(b) To take possession of his material and other sources of strength,
and
(c) To gain public opinion.
2. To accomplish the first purpose, we should always direct our principal
operation against the main body of the enemy army or at least against
an important portion of his forces. For only after defeating these can
we pursue the other two objects successfully.
3. In order to seize the enemy's material forces we should direct our
operations against the places where most of these resources are concentrated:
principal cities, storehouses, and large fortresses. On the way to these
objectives we shall encounter the enemy's main force or at least a considerable
part of it.
4. Public opinion is won through great victories and the occupation of
the enemy's capital.
5. The first and most important rule to observe in order to accomplish
these purposes, is to use our entire forces with the utmost energy. Any
moderation shown would leave us short of our aim. Even with everything
in our favor, we should be unwise not to make the greatest effort in order
to make the result perfectly certain. For such effort can never produce
negative results. Suppose the country suffers greatly from this, no lasting
dis- advantage will arise; for the greater the effort, the sooner the
suffering will cease.
The moral impression created by these actions is of infinite importance.
They make everyone confident of success, which is the best means for suddenly
raising the nation's morale.
6. The second rule is to concentrate our power as much as possible against
that section where the chief blows are to be delivered and to incur disadvantages
elsewhere, so that our chances of success may increase at the decisive
point. This will compensate for all other disadvantages.
7. The third rule is never to waste time. Unless important advantages
are to be gained from hesitation, it is necessary to set to work at once.
By this speed a hundred enemy measures are nipped in the bud, and public
opinion is won most rapidly. Surprise plays a much greater role in strategy than in tactics. It is
the most important element of victory. Napoleon, Frederick II, Gustavus
Adolphus, Caesar, Hannibal, and Alexander owe the brightest rays of their
fame to their swiftness.
The tools of war change through the ages, but the philosophy of war does not. In addition to reading his theory, I would also assign
The Guns of August to our President as some required reading. I have an old copy around somewhere that I can let him borrow.